555 and commercial activity. Therefore, if a schol-
565 ar did not pass the examination, or having passed
517 it, failed to obtain official appointment, and if the successive divisions of his family property reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he would find it difficult to improve his economic status. At the same time, his lack of economic means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in the social hierarchy.

555 The scholars, therefore, are not to be regard-
565 ed as a separate class or a separate occupational
● 647 group, except as they relied for their livelihood
517 on the teaching profession or the use of their literary skills in a clerical capacity, but rather as "leisure" members of families of varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial groups. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents of no current import. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only an additional sign of their prestige.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

575 the support of politicians, warlords as well as capitalists. Even the Kuomintang leaders had to come to terms with the society in their campaign against the warlords, and the Japanese occupation forces during 1937-1945 utilized Ch'ing-pang organizations to rout Communist underground agents.[8]

II. DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

647 596 178 Just as the scholar ideal and the family ideal helped to preserve the stability of the total social order of China, the disintegration of the traditional family system and the abolition of the imperial examination system for recruiting the ruling elite became contributing factors to the dislocation of the traditional social structure.

621 423 565 369 There was no change in the social composition of the rural population in the past several decades. As of old, the village community consisted of farm laborers at the bottom and landlords at the top. Peasant landowners and tenants constituted the bulk of the village population; and village peddlers, merchants, and artisans were members of peasant families, most of which owned land; the village gentry, that is to say the local leaders were mostly retired officials or educated members of landlords' or rich peasants' families.[9]

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8. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

9. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, p. 68.

1:Stanford U. S-4 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

VI. MINORITY NATIONALITIES

563 184 It can be said that there is no minority national group in the provinces of Hopei and Shansi. However, wherever such people are found in North China, no matter how few they are in number, the Communist government is making political capital by extending them favored treatment. The Mongols and Manchus in this region are so well assimilated by the Han Chinese that no line of distinction can be drawn between them. The H people, mainly because of their religion, are being given every recognition by the government in order to win support of all the members of Islamic faith within China and the sympathy of those in other countries. Although it is difficult to gauge how thoroughly the scattered Hui people in North China have been convinced of the Communists' good intentions, there is no basis to assume that they are not pleased with their priviledged position as a result of the regime's policy toward minority nationalities.

VII. OTHER GROUPS

184 665 647 In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have a significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily

184 665 647 have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers, and so far they have shown no sign indicating that their feelings may have changed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, the downfall of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1954 was the only serious rift in the Communist leadership. Even the Kao-Jao incident, which might have delayed repercussions in Northwest and East China, was quickly settled and left no perceptible political ripple in North China. A purge as violent as that which took place in Russia in the 1930's at present cannot as yet be predicted for China. Overshadowed by the unique personal prestige and cohesive power of Mao Tse-tung, the high-ranking Communist leaders, particularly the military, have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. This, of course, does not preclude future development of discord among Party leaders.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to prove their loyalty to Communism. The fact that the Party relies on close surveillance and an atmosphere of fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction

184 and dissidence within the Party ranks. Expansion of industrial centers in China necessitates
665 the promotion of numerous lower-level Party
• 647 functionaries. This certainly tends to make the old Party cadres resentful when they see the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for advancement, and the amenities of a wider social life.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. There is no doubt that these former Kuomintang personnel are reminded of the necessity of proving their thorough conversion to Communism. A sense of insecurity affects this group more virulently than it does the "securely situated" segments of the Chinese population.

VIII. CONCLUSION

184 The Communist system of multiple control, which penetrates all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with

I. PARTY CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS

A. Party and Government Fusion

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•647 The Communist Party control over government organs has been accomplished primarily by the fusion of government and Party in authority, in function, and in personnel at all levels. The chief instrument of the fusion is the subjection of all Party members in all government organizations to Party discipline and the wide establishment of Party branches in all these organizations. The functions of these Party branches in government organizations are twofold: to enforce Party directives and discipline and to instigate propaganda and indoctrination among non-Party members. The regulations governing Party branches working in government organizations issued by the North China Bureau in April 1952 spelled out these functions and techniques.[37] Seven duties were specified for Party branches in government offices, ideological training, the study of administrative techniques, adherence to all Party regulations, the strengthening of measures to safeguard security information and suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the direction of activities of the Youth Corps, and the inspection of work. These methods have generally been sufficient to assure absolute Party control over government organs and other "illegitimate" methods which might result in the disruption of administration have been strongly discouraged.

37. People's Daily, April 16, 1952, p. 3.

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647 The Party's well-established system of requiring Party members and branches to report progress and seek instructions is almost a part of administrative practice. To further the Party's control over administrative organs, the North China Bureau issued a directive establishing five further procedures.[38] (1) A Party democratic system was instituted whereby criticism and self-criticism became part of regular Party branch life with a view to strengthening Party discipline. (2) Political work and study were introduced with a view to remedying the lack of political education, especially in the economic and financial departments. (3) A personnel management system was devised to ensure the control of personnel policies in the hands of the department of organization of the Party. Appointments, transfers, promotions, and punishment of government personnel are handled by the appropriate Party department in consultation with the appropriate government department. Both senior Party members and heads of government organizations are prohibited from interfering. (4) More systematic working procedures were ordered so as to facilitate checks over Party branches and individual members. (5) New financial procedures were introduced which would prevent the personal use of official funds and other favors of corruption by senior Party members.

A second means of Party government fusion is placement of Party members in key administrative positions. On the regional level, for example, Liu Nan-t'ao, Chairman of the North China Administrative Committee under the Government

38. Ibid., July 9, 1952, p. 1.

665 Administrative Council, was also the third secre-
647 tary of the North China Party Bureau. Most of the commission chairmen under the regional committee were also Party leaders,[39] thus holding concurrent key positions in the two hierarchies.

Similar patterns are also seen at the provincial level. The then-Chairman of the Shansi Provincial Government, Ch'eng Ts' -hua, was also the First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, so was Yang Chi-feng, of Hopei Province and Yang Keng-t'ien of Chahar Province. The governors of the present administration bear the same qualification. A governor of a province can either be concurrently the First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, as is the case of Lin T'ieh of Hopei, or he may be the past First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of the same province, as is the case of P'ei Li-sheng of Shansi. The mayors of both Peking and Tientsin are at the same time First Secretaries of their respective Party Committees. P'eng Chen of Peking and Huang Huo-ch'ing of Tientsin.) -- See section of "Biographies of Key Personalities."

At lower levels, this fusion is even more obvious.

B. Cadre Utilization. Still another method through which the Party exercises its control over the administrative organs is in the selection and appointment of faithful and capable cadres

39. Chang Pan-shih, head of Dept. of Propaganda of North China Party Bureau, was con-
[continued next page]

665 (Party members as well as non-Party members)
647 to serve in the judicial, administrative and other State organs. The North China Bureau directive previously cited strengthened the Party's authority over personnel. The appointment of Party Secretaries to head personnel departments in government offices has further facilitated centralized amanagement.

After the promulgation of the Constitution, all personnel offices in government organizations were disbanded. This may indicate firmer control of personnel policies and their implementation by the Party.

C. Department of Supervision. Finally the Communist Party exercises direct control over government bodies through the offices of supervision, which were formerly under the People's Control Commission. Offices of supervision exist at all levels from the Central Government down to the county government and are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, the heads of these offices are either Party secretaries in charge of Party organization, or chiefs of public security agencies, which are watchful guardians for the Party. Personnel working in these offices are mostly Party members and activists. They carry out only Party directives.

Unlike the People's procuratore, which is called a "judicial organ," the offices of supervision are administrative organs; they investigate government employees to make certain that they have

[39. continued] currently Chief of Cultural/Educational Dept. of North China Adm. Committee. Appointment found: ibid., May 3, 1952, p. 6.

665 647 correctly executed government directives and are not guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, or corruption in the administrative organs and state enterprises.[40] Since 1953 offices of supervision have concentrated their attention on financial and economic organizations where waste and corruption are reportedly increasing.

The highest supervisory organ in the North China Region before 1954 was the North China People's Control Commission under the North China Administrative Committee. Similar commissions were organized in the provinces and administrative districts. At the 1955 Supervisory Conference,[41] it was decided to concentrate on the organization of these offices in key cities and counties and on the strengthening of their work in financial and economic organizations.

Supervisory branches are the agents of the department of supervision of a provincial government.[42] They may be established in any state enterprise, or financial, economic, or transportation office. In addition to their normal control functions they supervise production expenditures and the observance of fiscal regulations.

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40. For functions of People's Control Commissions consult report in ibid., June 13, 1950, p. 3.

41. Report on Conference, Enlightenment Daily, June 13, 1955, p. 1.

42. People's Daily, January 6, 1953, p. 1.

665 Three aditional[43] agencies are also operated
647 by the supervisory offices: the supervisory reporters, the complaint boxes, and the reception rooms. People's supervisory reporters may be sent out by the supervisory agencies, or selected from within the organization being inspected. In the nation as a whole, more than 100,000 such reporters have been operating. They are organized into small working teams to spy on the individual workers and to make direct accusations or to accept charges received in complaint letters and interviews with accusers. The complaint box and the reception room are the two major means of encouraging mass accusation. All Party and government agencies are required to offer these facilities and to manage them according to strict rule

665 ## II. PARTY CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

In utilizing the services of mass organizations for political advantage, Communist policies toward these organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. From the Party's point of view, mass organizations are political assets: (1) They serve as links between the Party and the masses. (2) They are the means through which the Party succeeds in organizing all sections of society. (3) Each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is

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43. Ibid., February 20, 1953, p. 3; and
Ibid August 3, 1953, p. 3.

668 The average peasant, for example, is required to
653 perform duties for the state periodically or on demand. The four seasonal drives in the rural districts require his active participation. In the construction of flood-control projects, peasants are forced to abandon their fields to labor in distant regions. For one such project in Hopei, about 125,000 workers were drafted. The service of the militia has been necessary to force compliance on many occasions. Young peasants are required to perform military service whenever the state deems it necessary. City dwellers are not exempt from similar public service, being subject to patrol duty in their own and neighboring areas whenever needed.

668 Controls imposed upon the people by security agencies and other organizations have been frequent causes of public discontent. The large-scale rationing program enforced in the cities and the constant investigations conducted by public security agencies cause a great deal of anger, if not threat of rebellion. Depsite the Communists' attempts to avoid the flagrant use of threats and force in approaching and controlling the public, the regime has been far from successful in preventing public discontent.

668 1. Tension within Organizations. The
647 employment of various control agencies to supervise and ensure the execution of Party directives has created suspicion and tension within the control agencies themselves and the supervised state, Party, and mass organizations.

Because the jurisdictions of the various control agencies often overlap, a government office or a factory may be subject to several controls at the same time. Pressure may be simultaneously exerted by as many as four control agencies-- the Control Committee of the Party, the supervisory office of the administration, the People's procuratorate, and one of the public security teams. Although the immediate focus of the policing agencies may differ, the effect of the multi-control system is to press in on every organization from all sides to extend its control to each member.

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Tension within organizations also results from over-centralization. In any centralized and "planned" society, not only are economic decisions based on a master plan, but all political and social policies are determined by directives originating at the head office. Pressures increase in direct proportion to the distance from the originating office; thus tension is greatest at the bottom of the chain of command. In politics, for example, directives emanate from the central government and are pssed on to the provincial government, and then to the governments on lower levels. This process continues until the desired result is achieved at the lowest political unit.

In the field of economic acitivity, each factory is given a production quota, assigned in a manner similar to that followed in political decisions. To fulfill this quota, every possible means of control is resorted to. The pressure, engendered, is constant. Both management and labor are held directly responsible for the attainment of assigned quotas. Failure to meet them

668 means severe penalties. Recently, the Communists attempted to improve their system of checking on the fulfillment of production quotas in order to eliminate the practice of submitting false reports of production achievements -- a strategy attempted in order to afford some temporary relief from mounting pressures.

2. Tension within Party Organizations.

668 Within the Party organizations themselves the 665 increase in pressure and tension is most revealing of the harm done to morale. In the first place, the Party apparatus is the center of power and activity for the regime. All Party directives and government policies are implemented by the Party bureaus. A Party member is subject to at least two systems of pressure -- that of the Party and that of the state. Secondly, Party members are subject to such an endless program of Party indoctrination and rectification that many of them cannot withstand such pressure, resulting often in their expulsion from the Party. Many people, outwardly in favor of the regime, become reluctant to join the Party. Most of the people expelled from the Party are confined in prison or forced labor camps; but some of them remain at large and could conceivably have joined discontented groups. Unless evidence to the contrary is disclosed, it can be presumed that some of the expelled Party members are willing to unite with subversive elements in a concerted effort to oust the present regime.

668 3. Tension within Mass Organizations.

Party pressure on mass organizations also leads

208 can we uncover regional variations.

In the course of this survey an attempt will be made to show the extent to which the people of North China are kept informed of public affairs and to what extent the information is permeated with propaganda.

I. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROPAGANDA

208 647 Prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Communist propaganda work in North China, especially in metropolitan cities such as Peiping and Tientsin, was intensive and influential. But such propaganda work at that time was carried on by underground Communist agents and Communist front organizations. Following the outbreak of the war, Communist party organizations began to function openly in many places in North China where Communist guerilla forces had their bases. From that time on, Communist propaganda work was in the main directly controlled and conducted by the propaganda organs of the Party; and local governments established by the Communists in various places played only a comparatively insignificant role in this regard. This state of affairs, however, underwent a great change upon the establishment of the Communist regime in Peking in 1949. Since then, propaganda in the North China region has been administered under a dual system consisting of the apparatus of the Communist Party of China and of the government at different levels.

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Two agencies existed prior to the abolition, in August 1954, of the regional authorities within both the governmental and party hierarchies: the Department of Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the regional government. Although these organizations took orders from their respective superiors on both the national and regional levels, the relationship between them appears to have been similar to that between the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee and the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council on the national level[1]

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1. Specifically, the Department of Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee operated under the direction of the bureau itself and of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs was directed by the North China Administrative Committee and by the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government.

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To put it more concretely, prior to August 1954 the Department or Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Party, like its counterpart on the national level was not primarily an operational agency. It did not do any major publishing nor did it operate any radio sation or cinema. It was devoted to the transmission of the propaganda policy of its superiors to appropriate agencies on the regional and provincial levels, drew up regional plans for the execution of the policy, and supervised the execution of that policy in each region by the Party, government, and mass organizations which operated the media of propaganda.

As for the department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the North China Administrative Committee, its functions were essentially the same as those of its counterparts on the national level. It was charged with the responsibility of the day-to-day management of propaganda as it found its expression in cultural and educational activities.

More specifically, the Department of Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Communist Party of China served primarily as a regional representative of the central authorities of the Party in the supervision of the execution of propaganda policy of a national nature, while the Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the North China Administrative Committee acted, to a large extent, as the chief regional executor of that policy in the region. But with regard to propaganda issues of a regional nature, the

208 Department of Propaganda of the North China
647 Bureau of the Party was the policy-maker. Its policies regarding regional propaganda issues became the policy of the region and were carried out by the Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee. This was achieved not by direct orders but by placing its own men in the latter organization. For example, when the regional authorities were in existence, Chang P'an-shih served as the principal link between the Department of Propaganda of the North China Bureau of the Party and the Department of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the North China Administrative Committee by heading both organizations concurrently. This was perfectly in line with the practice of the Communist Party of China of exercising leadership over the government on the China Mainland.

Such a dual system for the administration of propaganda is found on all local levels within the region. Even the lowliest Party branches or government units have their own propaganda agencies, which have the same working relationship with one another as their counterparts on the higher levels and which are supervised by their respective superior authorities. Thus, in the final analysis all local propaganda activities in the region are ultimately controlled and directed by the department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Although the above-mentioned agencies of the Party and government are charged with the responsibility of administering propagand and releasing information on public affairs, other agencies

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of the Party and government also have a certain role to play in these matters. Indeed, a considerable part of information, factual or otherwise, on the activities of individual government agencies often emanate from the agencies concerned.

II. MEDIA OF PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Ever since the Communist armies established their guerilla warfare bases in North China after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Communist propaganda agencies have been using all available means to communicate propaganda messages and information on public affairs which they want the people in North China to know. But for many years media of propaganda and public information available to the Communists in this region were meager, chiefly mimeographed newspapers, mimeographed magazines, pamphlets, posters, handbills, and so on. The only districts under Communist control at that time were in rural areas where more modern media of mass communication did not exist. But the lack of modern media of mass communication did not prevent the Communists from successfully disseminating their ideas and arousing popular sentiment sympathetic to their cause. People who visited Communist-controlled territories during the war were frequently impressed by the tremendous influence that Communist songs, Communist agitators' talks , and Communist-sponsored mass meetings had exercised upon the minds and spirits of the masses.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2h,
Political Background

KEY PERSONALITIES IN NORTH CHINA

I.

•647 North China, comprising some of the oldest "liberated areas" of Communist China, is administered at the upper bureaucratic levels by 47 men. As we might expect in a territory which has had a functioning Communist government since mid-1948, these incumbents are, on the whole, men of considerably more administrative experience than the holders of similar positions in other regions of China. At least 39 of the top bureaucrats are known to have held previous administrative posts in the North China government, and the total number of positions held is almost 100.

The pattern of the distribution of real authority, on the other hand, is the same as in the other regions of China: that is, certain men hold several key jobs concurrently, some hold one or two in addition to lesser regional posts, and so on down to the men whose single job -- almost invariably on a provincial level -- probably gives them very little prestige and only nominal authority. We find in North China, also the same pattern of Communist Party control which distributes Party men throughout

647 the region in key positions and ensures Party domination of economic and social as well as political activities.

There are certain features of the administration of North China which deserve special mention. For one thing, the number and variety of the semi-political organizations to which these administrative leaders belong offer an excellent example of Communist utilization of "middle" or "third force" groups to win the support of non-Communists and then to guide this support along acceptable Party lines. The significant number of non-Party men who have been given key positions -- sometimes apparently at the expense of Party members -- is illustrative of how the Communists have solved the problem of managing the necessary administrative machinery despite a shortage of adequately trained Party personnel. The presence of two urban centers -- Peking and Tientsin -- also contributes to the special characteristics of the North China administrative personnel.

We shall examine first the common denominators in the background of the group, and then the distribution among its members of administrative and political functions. We can then determine which incumbents, through multiple office-holding, have real power in the regional chain of command, and can examine these key men and their administrative relationship to each other, in order to see how the Communist

647 Party maintains authority despite its relatively small size and the vastness of the administration which it controls.

COMMON DENOMINATORS IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE GROUP

We have information on the background and early careers of only 20 men out of the 47. We know only the present position of 12 men, and we have data on posts held since 1949 for 17. The information available concerns positions held in the North China administration only, and does not reveal the background or training of the incumbents.

The data on the remaining 20, however, reveals several interesting characteristics. Two of the men are of peasant origin, for example, while 14 are well educated, having had normal school, junior college, or university training. Only two of them received their higher education at military institutions. Similarly, while six have had military careers (including guerrilla activities and participation in military revolts as well as regular army careers), 14 are knwon to have had nonmilitary careers in education, journalism, business, and industry; in non-Party political activities (i.e., Kuomintang and various anti-Japanese associations); and in organizational work of the Communist Party of China.

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DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS

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The 47 key personalities under study occupy a total of 133 positions. On a national level they hold 42 posts, which include delegate to the 1st National People's Congress, member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC, NPC committee chairman, member of the standing committee of the 2d National Committee and member of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, member of the National Defense Council, member of the State Council, and, in one case, Minister of Higher Education.

Regionally our survey includes incumbents of the following posts: governor of the Hopei and Shansi provincial People's governments; mayor of the Peking and Tientsin municipal People's governments; deputy-governor and deputy-mayor of the same governments; chairman and vice-chairman of the provincial and municipal committees of the Chinese People's P.C.C. in Hopei, Shansi, Peking and Tientsin; political commissar and commander of the military districts of Hopei, Shansi, Peking, Tientsin and North China. In all 49 such posts are held by 45 of the men under study. The four men who hold two regional positions each are three deputy-governors who are also vice-chairmen of provincial committees of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and the governor of Hopei, who

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647 is also political commissar of the Hopei Provincial Military District. The two men who, according to our data, hold only national positions are Yang Hsiu-feng, who is Minister of Higher Education, and Chang Su, who is a member of the standing committee and of the committee on bills of the 1st NPC.

The remaining 42 functions of the North China administrators are all of a political or semi-political nature. In this category we find officials in the Communist Party, the New Democratic Youth Corps, the Democratic League, the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, the San-min Chui-i Comrades' Association, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the China Association for Democratic Construction, the Chinese People's Committee for the Preservation of World Peace and Opposing American Aggression, the All-China Association of Industry and Commerce, the Chinese Association of Industry and Commerce, the Chinese Association of History, and the Chinese Association of Political Science and Law. The organized political co-operation of these non-Communist groups is an important element in the Communists' pattern of control, and the Party's emphasis has consistently been on strengthening the ideological and organizational ties of such groups to the Party.

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ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF POSITIONS HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY

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According to our figures, the key personalities in the North China administration average almost three positions each. Nineteen men, however, hold only one job, and in each case this is a regional administrative -- as opposed to national or political -- post. These incumbents include 14 deputy-governors and deputy-mayors, two commanders of provincial military districts (Hopei and Shansi), two presidents of People's high courts (Hopei and Tientsin) and the governor of the Shansi Provincial People's Government. In view of the senior status of the other governor and the two mayors in our survey, we may assume that the inclusion of P'ei Li-sheng, the governor of Shansi, in this one-position category is due to lack of complete information rather than to lack of rank.

Seven men hold two jobs. Only one of these has a national position -- Chang Yu-yü, an editor and legal expert of peasant origin who is now deputy-mayor of Peking and delegate to the 1st NPC. The other six occupy regional and political jobs, including deputy-governor (2), deputy-mayor (1), president of the People's high court (1), committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. (1), Chinese Association of Political Science and Law (1), New Democratic Youth Corps (2), Communist Party (4). The

647 two NDYC officials are included in the count of Communist Party members; the cases of the other two known Party officials will be considered below in connection with the status of key non-Party administrators.

When we look at the eight men who hold three jobs each, we note a decided increase in the number and rank of national offices. Ten national posts are held by these men; they include membership on the National Defense Council, the standing committee of the 1st NPC and the committee of bills of the 1st NPC as well as delegate to the 1st NPC and the Minister of Higher Education. We also find four Communist Party officials and two NDYC officials. Although these men do not constitute the top leadership in North China, their rank is certainly sufficient to make them significant figures in the administration of the region. Their names and positions are as follows:

Yang Hsiu-feng: Minister of Higher Education; del., 1st NPC; Communist Party official.

Chang Su: chm. committee on bills, 1st NPC; member, standing committee, 1st NPC; del., 1st NPC.

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647 Wang Shih-ying: del., 1st NPC; Dep.-Gov, Shansi; V-C., Shansi provincial committee, Chinese People's P.C.C.

Kao Shu-hsün: del., 1st NPC; member, National Defense Council; Dep.-Gov., Hopei.

Lo Sung-sheng: Dep.-Mayor, Peking; del., 1st NPC; member standing committee of the Exec. Com. All-China Association of Industry and Commerce.

Liu Hsiu-feng: Pres., Shansi People's High Court; member, 2d National Committee, Chinese People's P.C.C.; Communist Party official.

Chang Ta-chung: Sec. Peking Municipal Committee of the NDYC; member, Central Committee, NDYC; member, Peking Municipal People's Government.

Ko Pu-hai: Sec., North China Committee of the NDYC; member, Central Committee, NDYC; del., 1st NPC.

•647 The remaining 13 incumbents appear to constitute the senior leadership of North China. They hold a total of 75 positions, an average of 5.7 jobs each, which means that they occupy 56.4 per cent of all the posts noted for the entire group. These men are Po I-po, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Liu Lan-t'ao, Nieh Jung-chen, P'eng Chen, Li Chu-ch'en, Lin T'ieh, Huang Huo-ch'ing, Teng Ch'u-min, Chou Shu-t'ao Wu Han, Wang K'un-lun, and T'ao Lu-chia.

We find that these 13 men hold 30 -- or 71.4 per cent -- of the 42 national positions noted. All thirteen are delegates to the 1st NPC (out of a total of 20 delegates from the North China area) and they occupy all but 5 of the posts on national committees and councils held by men from the same region. These posts include seven on the standing committee of the 1st NPC, one on the committee on the Budget of the 1st NPC, two on the National Defense Council, two on the State Council, two on the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and three on the standing committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

Regionally, these 13 men hold 17 positions or somewhat over one third of the total in North China. These are, for the most part, key regional posts: commander of the North China, Peking, and Tientsin military districts;

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647 political commissar of the North China, Hopei, and Shansi military districts; chairman and vice-chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee and vice-chairman of the Tientsin Muncipal Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.; governor of Hopei and mayors of Peking and Tientsin; two deputy-mayors of Peking, one of Tientsin, and one deputy governor of Shansi. Furthermore, the distribution of these regional administrative positions is significant: in addition to three posts for the North China Military District, we find four each in Shansi, Peking, and Tientsin, and two in Hopei. One man, Lin T'ieh occupies both positions in Hopei - governor and political commissar. We may assume that in Hopei, interest is concentrated in the urban centers of Peking and Tientsin.

The 28 political functions which these 13 key men fulfill constitute two-thirds of the total among the entire group. Such posts include eight members of the CPC, seven members of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, two members of the Central Executive Committee of the Democratic League, one member of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, two members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Committee for the Preservation of World Peace and Opposing American Aggression, two members of the Executive Council. of the All China Association of Industry and Commerce, two members of the Executive Council of the Chinese Association of History,

•647 one member of the standing committee of the National Committee of the China Association for Democratic Construction, one member of the standing committee of the Central Committee of the San-min Chu-i Comrades' Association, one member of the standing committee of the National Committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, and one member of the Executive Council of the Chinese Association of Political Science and Law.

The regional affiliations of the men who hold these various political posts reveal a heavy concentration in Peking and Tientsin (11 and 7, respectively) and considerably less in the provincial areas (5 from Shansi, 1 from Hopei). This suggests the extent of the emphasis which the Communists have placed on political and semi-political groups in the urban centers.

THE ROLE OF NON-PARTY OFFICIALS

Five out of the thirteen key men discussed above are non-Party men. These five hold 12 national positions (40 per cent of those held by this group), 5 regional posts (39%), and 18 political jobs (64%). A total of 26 of these positions are held by men in Peking and Tientsin. This high proportion of posts held by non-Party key men indicates the successful degree to which the Communists put into operation the principle of broad coalition, particularly when they took over urban centers.

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•647 We know, for example, that after the capture of Tientsin in January 1949, Liu Shao-ch'i traveled to the city for the purpose of reassuring the commercial and industrial leaders about their future under the Communist government. Thus we find that Li Chu-ch'en, a priminent Tientsin industrialist, holds top positions on the Tientsin Municipal Council of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and the standing committee of the 1st NPC; Chou Shu-t'ao, another businessman, is a deputy-mayor of Tientsin; both men are members of the standing committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and they hold, between them, six ranking positions in political organizations.

We find, furthermore, three CPC members whose status, according to our data may have suffered by the inclusion of more highly trained or experienced non-Party personnel in the Communist administration after 1949: Chang Ch'eng-hsien, Ch'eng Hung-i, and Liu Hsiu-feng. Liu Hsiu-feng, for example, joined the Party in 1924 and devoted the next thirty years to guerilla, organizational, and administrative activities for the Party. He is now president of the People's High Court of Shansi Province, and a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., but he does not seem to have rank equal to Teng Ch'u-min, a former professor who first joined the Communist administration in 1949

647 (as a member of the 1st National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.) and is now vice-chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., deputy-governor of the Shansi Provincial People's Government, a member of the standing committee of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., a delegate to the 1st NPC and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC in addition to holding five offices in political political organizations. Teng Ch'u-min is not a Party member, as far as is known.

Ch'eng Hung-i held official positions in the CPC from the time of the Sino-Japanese war, but his exact Party status at present is unknown, and he is identified only as a deputy-mayor of Peking. Two non-Party deputy-mayors of Peking, on the other hand, are found among the 13 key men: Wu Han, a noted educator who is currently a member of the standing committee of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and a delegate to the 1st NPC in addition to holding top position in four political organizations, and Wang K'un-lun, a former Kuomintang Central Executive Committee member who is now a member of the standing committee of the Central Committee of the San-min Chu-i Comrades' Association, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association as well as being delegate

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•647 to the 1st NPC and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC.

Chang Cheng-hsien, now a deputy-governor of the Hopei Provincial People's Government, was the director of the department of propaganda of the P'ing-yüan Provincial committee of the CPC from 1949 to 1952, and a member of the North China Administrative Committee from 1952 to 1954, but his present Party status and any official positions which he may hold at present are unknown. In contrast, Kao Shu-hsün, a former Kuomintang army commander, who ia also a deputy-governor of Hopei, is in addition a member of the National Defense Council and a delegate to the 1st NPC.

We find, in these instances, concrete illustrations of the basis for the alleged disapproval of some members of the Communist Party of the "New Democratic" principle of co-operation with the "middle parties." This policy was necessary not only to enable the Communist government to utilize the trained personnel it so badly needed and to retain the organized support of the politically uncommitted groups whose friendship it had had during the civil war, but also to provide for the sharing of the responsibility for the implementation of government programs. It appears, however, to have resulted in the displacement and displeasure of some veteran Communists

•647 who have inferior technical or administrative training but who feel that their past sacrifices and contributions to the Communist cause entitle them to senior status.

KEY COMMUNIST PERSONNEL

647 Despite the apparent dislocation of some
665 Party men in favor of unaffiliated administrators, we find that top authority is not only definitely in Communist hands in North China, but substantially in the hands of men who are powerful on a national as well as a regional level. A brief glance at the positions of the eight Communists in the group of 13 senior officials indicates the extent to which this is true.

Po I-po, the well-known Communist leader long active in the North China area, is secretary of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and political commissar of the North China Military District (in addition to national posts on the State Council and 1st NPC). After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Po was commissioned by General Yen Hsi-shan to organize the Hsi-sheng Chiu-kuo T'ung-meng Hui (Self-Sacrifice Save-the-Country League), and after the occupation of Taiyuan by Japanese forces, he went to Southeast Shansi at the head of the first and second detachments of the so-called Chüeh-ssu Tsung-tui (Dare-to-Die

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665 Column). Early in 1949 he revolted against Yen Hsi-shan and went over to the Communist camp with all the forces of the Chüeh-ssu Tsung-tui. In 1945 Po was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPC, and during 1948-49 he served as first vice-chairman of the North China People's Government.

Nieh Jung-chen, who holds the second leading post in the regional party organization, is commander of the North China Military District and of the Peking and Tientsin garrison forces, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC. During the Sino-Japanese War, Nieh Jung-chen was commander of the Communist forces in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region. In 1948-49 he was commander of the North China People's Liberation Army and subsequently served as deputy chief-of-staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, former Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and concurrently a member of the Central Committee of the CPC is deputy-commander of the North China Military District.

The present regional position, if any, of Liu Lan-t'ao is not known, but he holds ranking positions on NPC committees and, as a reserve member of the North China Administrative Committee, probably outranks all but a

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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647 few of the senior leaders.

665 The other four key Communists hold top positions in the provincial and municipal administrations. They are the mayors of Peking and Tientsin, the governor of Hopei and the chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

P'eng Chen, mayor of the Peking Municipal People's Government, joined the CPC in the 1920s and was active in workers' movements for many years. After serving for three years as chairman of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC and political commissar to Lin Piao's United Democratic Army, he became secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Party in February 1949. In addition to his mayoralty, he is vice-chairman of the 2d National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. and a delegate to the 1st NPC.

Huang Huo-ch'ing, secretary of the Tientsin Municipal Committee of the CPC, is also mayor of the Tientsin Municipal People's Government and a member of the standing committee of the 1st NPC. Lin T'ieh, governor of the Hopei Provincial People's Government, has been secretary of the Hopei Provincial Committee of the CPC and political commissar of the Hopei Provincial Military District since 1950. T'ao Lu-chia, the secretary of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the CPC, is also

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647 political commissar of the Shansi Provincial
665 Military District, chairman of the Shansi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and delegate to the 1st NPC.

These eight leaders, then, occupy the key positions in North China. Here, as in other parts of China, the central leadership of the CPC appears to keep a tight control over decisions in the regional and provincial government administrations. More detailed and revealing analyses of leadership patterns must await the availability of further biographical data.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12

the court. "Because of the inconvenience to the people" the separate court was abolished in the spring of 1914. Instead of having separate assessors, the judicial cases were handled by officers who were sent by the provincial government at the request of the magistrate. Ting Hsien had two such officers, one for civil and one for criminal cases.

The hsien government was reorganized again in 1928 after the forces of the Nationalist Government had taken Peking and unified the government and "the Republic had been established in the victory of the Revolution". There were then three sections and the four bureaus of public safety, finance, education, and construction. The First Section was in charge of police, fire protection, sanitation, health, relief, forest protection, and census. The Second Section was responsible for lands, agriculture, engineering, roads, bridges, waterways, labor, industry, business, schools, libraries, museums, and parks. The Third Section looked after the fiscal affairs of the hsien, appropriations for the hsien budget, taxes in money and grain, taxation on land, loans, public lands, local finance, audit, and the handling of hsien funds and hsien property. The work of each section was in charge of a section head, an assistant head, and from three to five clerks. The monthly salary of a section head was $60, of his associate from $30 to $40, of a clerk $11. The heads of the three sections and the four bureaus met weekly as the hsien government committee to discuss problems and plan for the improvement of the administrative program.

In 1928 another effort was made to establish a separate court of justice responsible to the high provincial court rather than to the magistrate. The court was organized with a judge, a judicial officer and five clerks, a prison staff of 12, a prison head, one matron, 10 guards, 10 judicial police, and 10 regular police. The budget of the court was $180 a month, or $5,760 per year. This was paid from the provincial treasury rather than from hsien funds.

In spite of the new organization the court was not entirely removed from the control of the magistrate. He generally was able to influence the high court in the appointment of the judge and he had to review and approve all court decisions before they were carried out.

The reorganization of 1928 added the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Board and its subsidiary organizations to the hsien political machinery. Members of the Kuomintang had been working secretly in Ting Hsien from 1924, and thus were prepared to develop an organiza-

3:Chao E-5 (1939-1941)1948 AF12 North China AF12

Politically, P'ing-chiao-tsun is under the jurisdiction of the Peiping municipality. The protection of life and property of the villagers depends to a very great extent upon how well the municipal police functions in this district. On many occasions in the past when the police machinery was restrained or destroyed, the people of the village had to flee to the city for safety. Occasionally, arrests are made by the police because certain individuals are suspected of having joined the gang which steals jewels from tombs of Manchu nobles in neighboring districts or of having manufactured heroin or opium, or of some other crimes.

According to municipal regulations with slight modification in practice, the smallest political unit is the *chia* 甲 consisting of ten households; above this is the *pao* 保 consisting of ten *chia;* four *pao* at present join together into a *lien-pao* 連 保; altogether the northern-suburban police district has twenty-three *lien-pao.* The chief function of this *pao-chia* system is to assist the police in maintaining order. The divisional heads of the *pao-chia* are appointed by the bureau of police of the municipal government. There are six *chia* in P'ing-chiao-tsun, but, strangely enough, one of the six heads of the *chia* does not have his usual residence in the village and no attention is paid to this by the police. The head of the *pao* is a resident of P'ing-chiao-tsun, but he is responsible for a district larger than his village.

Before the inauguration of this *pao-chia* system, the villagers were supposed to have local self-government, according to which the northern suburban district was subdivided into *fang* 坊 and *li* 里. The *fang-li* system had been abolished for some time, but it recently has been re-established and now exists along side the *pao-chia* system. The heads of the *fang* and *li* are appointed by the city mayor and are to assist the municipal government in collecting taxes, building roads and other works of construction. The head of the *li* is a resident of P'ing-chiao-tsun and is responsible for about fifty households. It happens that this *li*-head is also a *chia*-head.

In addition, there are the two systems of "road protection village" *ai hu tsun* 愛護村 and *ti-ch'u fen hui* 地區分會 or "regional subdivision". P'ing-chiao-tsun has a "road protection village" head who is also the head of the *pao* and is responsible to a Japanese officer in the railway station about a mile away from the village. The *ti-ch'u fen hui* system was only recently inaugurated by the Hsin Min Hui 新民會, the only political party in the Peiping-Tientsin political area. It takes over the green-crop tax-collecting function from the *lien-pao.*

3:Chao E-5 (1939-1941)1948 AF12 North China AF12

631 Only a few of the villagers pay any attention to all these systems
647 of government. The majority do not care for them and expect nothing good from them. Nevertheless, their life is affected by these complicated systems of political organization. They are being taxed by them either in money payment or in labor service or both.

The heads of these political divisions do not consider it as an honour to receive an office from these governing bodies. The duties fall on them and they cannot escape. Much of their time is required by these duties. Their responsibility is great but their compensation is nil. Indeed, the office of *pao*-head was first offered to a member of the richest family of the village, but he refused by leaving the village and staying a few months in the city. He was rich and could afford to do that. How could the other fellows in the village refuse any offer from the governing bodies above them?

627 The village-folks still follow their own ways of doing things and solving their own problems. The last thing they would consider would be litigation in the municipal court. When someone has committed a minor offence, all the villagers keep silent about it. In case it is found out by the police, go-betweens help out the villagers with simple gifts to the minor officials.

Smooth relations among the villagers cannot continue for an indefinite period. Some petty incidents occur from time to time among the villagers. Under such circumstances, the principle of "to have big incidents dissolved into small ones and small incidents into nothing at all" is preferred.

Thus, with "crimes" committed against government regulations by a villager, the principle of non-intervention and inaction is followed. With misconduct committed against fellow villagers, all available means are mobilized to have the matter settled quietly. So far no inter-village conflict has been observed. On principle, leaders of the villages concerned would have the conflict solved quietly. In case no solution can be worked out, litigation is inevitable, but such is a great mishap indeed and in the mind of the village-leaders it is to be avoided by all means.

622 The leaders are indeed important personalities. They take care of private as well as public affairs. Although observing the principles of non-intervention and inaction, they are very often requested to render assistance. When family property is, for instance, to be divided among the sons of a family, a person of age and prestige, whether relative or not, is requested to assist.

4: Burgess E-4,5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

in the guilds in Peking. The problem is a similar one although the government agencies now dealing with the guilds are more complicated.

Peking had in 1919 a population of 811,556,[1] of which an unusually large proportion were males — 63.5 per cent.[2] The reason for this undue proportion is the very large number of officials living in Peking without their families and the army of expectant officials awaiting appointment, and also the large male student population. In 1919 there were 16,879 students in modern-style high schools and colleges. The number has greatly increased since then. The large number of men and boys in shops and stores who have come in from the country, away from their families, is another factor.

Because Peking is a city with such a high percentage of officials and students, one looks in vain for any considerable body of local gentry. The official group comes from every province and practically from every city in China, and the students come from a similarly wide area. One would naturally suppose that the guilds in Peking would be less affected by the pressure of public opinion than would those in other cities, for there is little unity in the conglomerate group of temporary residents that make up the official and student ranks.

Modern industry has affected Peking very little indeed.

Other cities in China point with pride to the modern factories which they have established, but Peking has little industry that is efficient and on a modern basis. The city has long been a political rather than an industrial center, and the local octroi charges have tended to discourage the establishment of modern factories inside the walls. The principal examples of modern industry are the telephone company, the electric light company,

[1] Gamble and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 99.